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Unconditional Surrender: The Rise of President Erdogan 
and the end of Kemalist Turkey 
 
By Amelia Sullivan 
 
 
Abstract: In October 1923, Mustafa Kemal, or Ataturk, became 
leader of Turkey. Over the next decade and a half, Kemal used his 
considerable political power to reform the nation. He modernized 
infrastructure, reorganized government, and led an aggressive 
campaign to westernize and secularize Turkish society. By the time 
Kemal passed in 1938, Turkey rose from the ashes of the Ottoman 
Empire and reestablished itself as a democracy. Almost eighty 
years later, Ataturk’s legacy is in jeopardy. In 2017, the Turkey 
held a constitutional referendum to radically restructure the 
nation’s government and place an unprecedented degree of power 
in the office of the presidency. The new constitution passed by a 
narrow margin in a referendum marred by allegations of fraud and 
intimidation. By closely examining sources such as the 1924 
Turkish Constitution, the revised Constitution’s proposed 
amendments, and Erdogan’s past political history, this paper seeks 
to answer several questions: How will the revised constitution 
restructure Turkish government? What will a Turkey under 
Erdogan’s leadership look like? Is this the end of secular Turkey 
as Ataturk envisioned it? 
 
 
Since the earliest day of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk (1881-1938) maintained that, “Sovereignty belongs 
unconditionally to the people,” and for decades, this dictum laid at 
the very foundation of Turkish governance.1 In October 1925, 
Kemal was unanimously elected the first President of the newly 
formed Republic of Turkey. His election marked the beginning of 
an era of sweeping social, political, and religious reform within the 
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nation. Ataturk shifted Turkey away from Ottoman systems of 
religious authoritarianism and created a new government based 
upon the principles of secular democracy. For nearly one hundred 
years, Ataturk’s undying belief in democracy and secularism 
guided Turkish politicians as they amended the nation’s 
constitution or created new laws. Recent events, however, conspire 
to bring an end to Ataturk’s vision. 
 On April 16, 2017, Turkey held a referendum on a revised 
Constitution, proposed by the ruling Justice and Development 
Party (AKP). The revised constitution is comprised of eighteen 
amendments, eliminating the role of Prime Minister, weakening 
the Parliament, and greatly expanding the authority of the 
Presidency. The document passed by a narrow margin, opening a 
schism in Turkish public opinion. The Constitution’s proponents 
argue that the document’s ratification prevents the return of the 
fragile coalition governments that have haunted Turkey’s past.2 In 
addition, a more powerful presidency would end conflict between 
various branches of government, allowing the nation to pull itself 
from political stagnation. Opponents of the proposal, however, 
argue that a strong executive branch could spell the end of the 
Republic of Turkey and the return to autocratic rule.3 The nation’s 
current President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan (b. 1954), is Ataturk’s 
polar opposite. Erdogan is a devout Muslim, an ardent admirer of 
Turkey’s Ottoman past, and once stated that “democracy is like a 
train… we shall get out when we arrive at the station.”4 Damning 
evidence of Erdogan’s anti-democratic ambitions surfaced in the 
wake of the referendum. Videos showed referendum officials 
marking blank ballots in favor of the revised constitution, or some 
individuals voting more than once.5 Testimony corroborating the 
videos’ content emerged shortly thereafter. The opposition accused 
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the President and his officials of rigging the referendum and called 
for the constitution’s nullification. Many fear that with nearly 
unlimited executive power, Erdogan will discard Ataturk’s 
secularist policies, override the people’s sovereignty, and 
transform the Republic into an Islamic dictatorship.  
 This paper will be divided into two broad categories: the 
first discussing the 1924 Turkish Constitution and its history, while 
the second focuses on Erdogan and his motivations. In its first 
section, this paper will discuss Turkey’s Ottoman past, Ataturk’s 
rise to power, and his subsequent reimagining of Turkey as a 
secular democracy. The paper will then examine the 1924 Turkish 
Constitution’s provisions in order to establish the role of President, 
Parliament, and Prime Minister. In addition, this section will offer 
background on the revised Constitution, summarize its eighteen 
amendments, then compare and contrast the new document against 
the 1924 Constitution. In doing so, this paper will illustrate how 
the revised Constitution will totally restructure Turkish 
Government. 
 In its second section, the paper will offer background on 
President Erdogan and examine where Erdogan’s ideological 
convictions deviate from Ataturk’s. The paper will closely 
scrutinize Erdogan’s tenure as President and examine numerous 
anti-democratic statements and policies espoused by Erdogan. 
Close analysis of Erdogan’s words and actions will allow for an 
accurate estimation of where Erdogan will likely lead the nation 
and the threat he poses to the Republic of Turkey’s survival as a 
secular democracy. 
 
The Republic of Turkey and the Ottoman Legacy 
 
For nearly six centuries, the Ottoman Empire remained the 
dominant power in the Middle East. At the height of its power, the 
Empire’s borders engulfed much of the Middle East, as well as 
parts of southeastern Europe and northern Africa. Within these 
territories, the Ottomans created a diverse, thriving society based 
upon systems of military-patronage, trade, and religion.6 Islamic 
scripture formed the basis of government. Only the word of the 
sultan, the spiritual and political leader of the Empire, rivaled the 
                                                






importance of the word of the Qur’an. As such, a mixture of 
Islamic and dynastic law guided Ottoman courts and politics.7 
However, by the seventeenth-century, the Empire lapsed into a 
state of social, economic, and political decline. Newly 
industrialized European nations bested Ottoman armies and 
relentlessly chipped away at the edges of the Empire. 
Simultaneously, the rise of nationalism amongst numerous subject 
populations, such as the Serbians, Bulgarians, Greeks, and many 
others, embroiled the Ottomans in a succession of intractable 
rebellions. Ottoman leadership attempted to reverse the Empire’s 
decline by westernizing the military, education systems, and 
various facets of government. These reforms came to a head under 
sultan Abdulhamid II (r. 1876–1909), who hoped the creation of a 
constitution and parliament might rejuvenate the Empire.8 
However, his hopes would prove to be short lived. Instead of 
reversing the Empire’s decline, the newly elected parliament 
became paralyzed over the course of the government 
administration. Frustrated with parliamentary inaction, 
Abdulhamid II nullified the Constitution in 1878 and reclaimed 
political authority, putting an end to the era of reform.9  
A group of young Turkish soldiers and intellectuals, 
however, grew increasingly dissatisfied with the Ottoman 
sultanate. They formed an influential movement called the Selanik 
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), also called the Young 
Turks. In 1908, the Young Turks seized political authority by 
forcing the sultan to reinstate the Constitution.10 From there, they 
attempted to modernize the nation. Their efforts, however, had 
little effect upon the overall health of the Empire. Political 
instability shook Ottoman territories as the Young Turks struggled 
to remain in power as those loyal to the sultanate rebelled against 
their rule.11 The once powerful Ottoman Empire was hurtling 
towards collapse; under pressure from both external adversaries 
and internal political chaos. By the early twentieth-century, 
Ottoman political and social stability grew so weak, European 
                                                
7 Gelvin, The Modern Middle East, 29. 
8 Donald Everett Webster, The Turkey of Ataturk (Philadelphia: The American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, 1939), 22. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., 24. 






leaders joked that the Empire had become the “Sick Man of 
Europe.” 
In 1914, World War I erupted following the assassination 
of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand, by Serbian Nationalist Gavrilo Princip. When Austria-
Hungary and its ally Germany, hungry for revenge, declared war 
on Serbia, the Ottoman Empire made the unfortunate decision to 
side with them. The Ottoman military was ill prepared for war, 
despite efforts to westernize its structure. This weakness forced the 
Ottomans to withdraw from the conflict in October 1918.12 
Following Allied victory over the Central Powers later that year, 
the Ottomans hoped that the victors might show some respect for 
their power and allow the Empire to retain its remaining territories. 
Their hopes were dashed, however, when American President 
Woodrow Wilson called for the dismemberment of Ottoman 
territories along ethnic lines.13 The rest of the Allied Powers, 
hungry for revenge against the Central Powers, offered terms that 
were little better. At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, British 
Prime Minister Lloyd George demanded that the Ottomans be 
expelled from Anatolia. French Prime Minister Georges 
Clemenceau spoke in similar language, stating that Ottoman rule 
should be withdrawn.14 There seemed little hope that Ottoman 
territories would remain intact. In 1920, the sultanate signed the 
Treaty of Sevres, which divided the Empire between Turkish and 
non-Turkish regions.15 In addition, the Allies divided western 
Anatolia between Greece, Italy, and France. The European powers 
immediately sent armies to secure these claims, aggravating the 
local Turkish populations and leading to rising levels of Turkish 
nationalism.16 In unoccupied Anatolia, nationalist resistance 
formed to repel the occupiers. In response, the government 
dispatched a young Turkish general named Mustafa Kemal to 
suppress the rebellion. 
Rather than carrying out his orders, Kemal rose to power as 
leader of the resistance movement. For the next two years, he 
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repelled attacks from foreign troops in Anatolia. These victories 
earned Kemal and his resistance respect and prestige. Using this 
newfound power, Kemal ordered the creation of a Grand National 
Assembly, despite the Ottoman sultan’s attempts to thwart its 
creation.17 Though fiercely anti-Islamist, Kemal appealed to the 
religious authorities within the Assembly in order to gather further 
support from the Islamic population. By 1921, Kemal gained 
enough political leverage to introduce the Law of Fundamental 
Organization, a twenty-three-article document that created a new 
government in which sovereignty belonged “…without restriction 
to the nation.”18 This led to the subsequent abolition of the 
sultanate in 1922, thereby freeing Turkey from imperial control. In 
October 1923, Kemal further utilized this political favor in order to 
bring about the rebirth of Turkey as a Republic. The assembly 
unanimously accepted his proposal, then subsequently elected 
Kemal the first President of the fledgling Republic. 
 
Ataturk: A Legacy of Westernization and Secularism 
 
Mustafa Kemal’s election marked the beginning of an era of great 
social, political, and religious reform within Turkey. Before the 
Republic’s birth, Kemal disguised himself as an ardent supporter 
of Islamic law and governance. In reality, however, Kemal 
believed that religion stifled progress and “…loosened the national 
ties of the Turkish nation.”19 Rather than studying Islamic scripture 
for guidance, Kemal turned to European political and scientific 
thought. He saw the Republic as a nation guided by scientism, and 
popularly held theories of Turkish racial superiority, based upon 
Darwinian evolutionary theory.20 Kemal believed that this blend of 
western concepts formed the basis of a new type of nationalism, 
which would prove more crucial to the formation of Turkish 
identity than religion. Turkey could only survive if Turks 
“…dismissed religion as an obsolete institution devised in a 
bygone era.”21 Islam meant stagnation, and so Kemal sought to 
eliminate it from government.  
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In 1926, Kemal declared the Seriat, or Muslim codes which 
guided Ottoman legal processes, null and void.22 The old laws, 
with their deep roots in Islamic scripture and tradition, were ill-
adapted to modern life. In their place, Kemal’s Grand National 
Assembly passed Civil Codes, Debt Laws, Penal Codes, and 
Commercial Codes based upon Swiss, Italian, and German law.23 
He further ordered the abolition of religious schools, as well as 
courts based upon the Seriat, and banned ecclesiastical garb 
outside mosques.24 In their stead, Kemal instituted a westernized 
school system which taught a new Turkish script, courts based 
upon the new established secular Turkish law, and western garb.25 
In addition to education, legal, and clothing reform, Kemal pursued 
the liberalization of women’s roles within the Republic. Ottoman 
government, with its firm basis in Islamic scripture, prohibited 
women from participation in government or some aspects of social 
life. Kemal believed that in order for the Republic to progress, 
women needed to be granted legal equality. Early in his 
presidency, he ordered the creation of a commission dedicated to 
granting women civil rights to achieve this objective.26 When the 
Civil Codes were revised, legislators granted women a number of 
freedoms, including equal rights in marriage, property holding, and 
before the courts.27 In 1930, Kemal pushed the envelope further by 
granting women the right to vote in elections and become village 
leaders or members of city councils.28 National suffrage and the 
right to run for office in the Grand National Assembly followed 
five years later. As a result of these reforms, Turkish women 
finally possessed a formal voice in social and governmental affairs.  
The secularization of Turkish law, education, and 
governance, were all major victories in Kemal’s campaign to 
engineer a new Turkish identity. However, despite these successes, 
Kemal’s transformation of the nation was not yet complete. This 
new identity, Kemal believed, must be celebrated. In 1934, Kemal 
determined that Turkish names, like the nation, should be 
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westernized, and all Turkish citizens were required by law to adopt 
hereditary surnames. At first glance, the introduction of surnames 
may seem ephemeral compared to Kemal’s legal and legislative 
reforms, but its cultural significance should not be ignored. 
Throughout history, the vast majority of Turks had simply been 
known by titles or first names. The introduction of surnames 
represented the wholesale adoption of a western cultural tradition 
into the personal life of every Turk. More importantly, new 
surnames were required to be Turkish, and not reference tribal or 
foreign origin, in order to help solidify the republic’s nascent 
national identity. The Turkish people granted Kemal a surname 
that reflected his place in citizens’ hearts—Ataturk, or “Father 
Turk.”29 This act emphasized the liberation of the Republic from 
its Ottoman heritage, symbolizing a new beginning for the Turkish 
people. 
In summary, Ataturk’s rise to power marked an era of 
profound social, political, and religious reformation within Turkey. 
He drew on his study of western political and scientific thought in 
order to methodically build a framework for a new nation. Ataturk 
struck down Islamic religious code and ecclesiastical dress, 
replacing them with laws based on European systems of 
governance and Western garb. He closed religious schools, granted 
women legal equality, and pioneered the creation of a new Turkish 
script. These reforms resulted in both the creation of a new Turkish 
identity and the liberation of the Republic from its Ottoman roots.  
 
The Republic of Turkey: Democracy and Parliament 
 
During the Turkish War of Independence, the Law of Fundamental 
Organization served as the unofficial Constitution of Turkey. By 
1923, however, Ataturk knew the document needed expansion in 
order to delineate the powers allotted to each branch of the new 
nation’s government. Thus, Ataturk and the Grand National 
Assembly used the Law of Fundamental Organization as the basis 
of a new code of laws that would serve as the Republic’s 
permanent Constitution. In order to build a strong and lasting 
system of governance, Ataturk carefully examined the structural 
weaknesses of the Ottoman Empire. The first weakness, he 
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determined, was religion. Religion, he believed, stagnated the 
technological and political progress of the Empire, thereby leading 
to its eventual downfall. Secularization of social customs and 
government solved this problem. The Empire’s second weakness, 
Ataturk believed, was the fact that Ottomans did not allow the 
common individual a voice in the nation’s future. Under the old 
system, the sultan possessed absolute authority over the 
governmental and spiritual direction of the Empire. Next in power 
were the social and religious elite, whose authority was, in turn, 
determined by their proximity to the sultan. At the bottom of 
Ottoman society were the Empire’s citizens, separated from the 
sultan by a vast social and bureaucratic divide. They possessed no 
voice in Ottoman governance and lived in accordance with laws set 
not by themselves, but by the elite. Because the Empire took little 
interest in the common people, they eventually became dissatisfied 
by the established order and rebelled. The Republic could not 
make the same mistake. Common men and women needed to be 
engaged in government. This meant the system not only needed to 
be a secular one, but one that allowed the Turkish people a voice in 
their nation’s future. Therefore, in Ataturk’s estimate, democracy 
was an essential cornerstone to ensure the success and longevity of 
the new Republic.  
 Democracy, however, could not exist without a proper 
governing body. Political authority could not belong to one 
individual, such as the Ottoman sultan. During the Turkish War of 
Independence, the Grand National Assembly served as wartime 
government, with Ataturk serving as its political leader. Ataturk 
decided, the Assembly would continue to be the nation’s governing 
body, with powers delineated by new laws. Members of the 
Assembly would not be members of the aristocracy or chosen by 
proximity to Ataturk. Instead, the Turkish people elected 
representatives. This reflected the new government’s dedication to 
not only democracy, but to the sovereignty of the people. There 
existed no social or bureaucratic distance between citizens and 
their elected officials. Turks were now directly involved with the 
social and political future of the nation in a manner that had not 
been possible under the Ottoman system of governance. These 
objectives, would ultimately become the ideological basis of the 
1924 Constitution. 
 





and Prime Minister 
 
The 1924 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey represents the 
nation’s revolutionary transformation from the rigid, religious 
monarchy of the Ottoman Empire to the secular democracy of the 
Republic of Turkey. In order to better understand the significance 
of 2017’s revised Constitution, one must examine elements of the 
original Constitution in detail, namely sections pertaining to the 
President of the Republic, the Turkish Parliament, and the Prime 
Minister. In essence, the 1924 Constitution transformed Turkey 
into a parliamentary republic. 
 The 1924 Constitution provides detailed instruction on the 
selection of the President as well as the powers attributed to the 
office. Section one of the Constitution states that legislative and 
executive powers are vested in the Grand National Assembly. The 
Assembly exercises executive authority through the President of 
the Republic and his Cabinet.30 The President, therefore, is not the 
center of executive power—the Grand National Assembly is.31 
Section three summarizes the President’s selection and his role. 
The members of the Assembly elect the President for the period of 
a parliamentary term. The President cannot take part in discussions 
or deliberations of the Assembly or vote upon any issue. 
Furthermore, it is the President’s duty to promulgate laws voted by 
Assembly, as well as to veto any laws which he does not consider 
favorable for Turkey’s future. The Assembly may, however, 
overrule the President’s veto through a majority vote.32 Though the 
Grand National Assembly possesses supreme command of the 
military, it exercises its command over the armed forces through 
the office of the President. In times of peace, however, the military 
resides in the care of the Chief of Staff. Though the President 
nominates the Chief of Staff, the nominee cannot assume office 
without the approval of the Grand National Assembly.33 The 
President also chooses the President of the Council of 
Commissioners (the Prime Minister) from the members of the 
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Grand National Assembly.34 In accordance with its founding 
principle of democracy, the 1924 Constitution grants a majority of 
executive power to the Grand National Assembly, not the 
President. The Presidency was, therefore, a largely ceremonial 
head of state. True legislative and executive power rested in the 
hands of the Parliament and Prime Minister. 
 In addition to clearly delineating the powers granted to the 
Presidency, the 1924 Constitution outlines the selection of 
members of the Turkish Parliament, or Grand National Assembly, 
as well as the duties and limits of its power. In section one, the 
Constitution states that the Grand National Assembly is “the sole 
lawful representative of the nation, and exercises sovereignty in the 
name of the nation.”35 Furthermore, legislative and executive 
powers are “vested and centered” in the Assembly.36 The 
electorate, therefore, grants the Assembly its considerable political 
power.  
Section two states that Assembly members are elected in 
accordance with electoral law. This means they cannot be 
individuals who are in service to a foreign power, those 
condemned to penal service, those acknowledging foreign 
nationality, those condemned for bankruptcy, those deprived of 
their civil rights, or those who cannot read and write in Turkish.37 
The Grand National Assembly also possesses the power of 
“interpellation” and of “conducting investigations and 
parliamentary inquiries.”38 This tenant of the Constitution gives the 
Assembly the right to submit questions to the government. In cases 
where an authority such as the President acts in an undesirable 
way, the Assembly may hold a vote of confidence or institute a 
change in government. Article twenty-six states the Assembly 
“makes, amends, interprets and abrogates laws” and “concludes 
conventions and treaties of peace with other states.”39 Furthermore, 
the Assembly is responsible for declarations of war, examining and 
ratifying documents by the Commission on the Budget, coining 
money, and accepting or rejecting contracts or concessions 
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involving financial responsibility.40 Under the 1924 Constitution, 
the Grand National Assembly held the majority of legislative and 
executive power as well as control over economic, judicial, and 
diplomatic affairs. Due to their status as elected representatives of 
the Turkish people, the concentration of power within the 
Assembly reflected one of the Constitution’s key principles—
democracy. 
 The Prime Minister’s selection process as well as the 
powers and limits of the role are, like those of President and 
Parliament, detailed within the 1924 Constitution. In Mead Earle’s 
translation, he refers to the Prime Minister as the “President of the 
Council of Commissioners.” In the Constitution’s third section, it 
states that the President of the Republic chooses the President of 
the Council “from among the deputies,” or members of the 
Assembly.41 After being selected by the President, the Prime 
Minister nominates other members of the Council. The President 
must then approve these choices. If the President approves of the 
selection, he presents the list of prospective candidates to the 
Assembly. The Assembly deliberates over the list for a week, then 
determines whether or not it will accept or reject the nominated 
individuals.42 The Constitution then goes into detail about the 
duties of the Prime Minister. According to article forty-six, the 
Council of Commissioners is “collectively responsible for the 
general policies of government.”43 Additionally, each member is 
“responsible within the scope of his authority for the general 
character of his policy and the actions of his subordinates.”44  
This means the Prime Minister and the rest of the 
Commissioners are responsible for the smooth function of 
government administration. The end of section three states that, in 
tandem with a Council of State, the Council of Commissioners 
shall “promulgate regulations for the administration and execution 
of the law, provided that such regulation shall not contain new 
clauses.”45 The 1924 Constitution paints the role of Prime Minister 
as one responsible for the function and maintenance of 
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government. While the President represents the nation on the 
national level, the Prime Minister works to ensure that the 
Republic functions according to the letter of the law. Due to the 
nature of the office, the Prime Minister holds a more active role in 
the governance of the nation than the President. The Prime 
Minister like the President, however, is still beholden to the Grand 
National Assembly, and in turn, the people of Turkey. The Prime 
Minister, like President and Parliament, ultimately derives its 
power from the citizenry. 
 The 1924 Constitution clearly defines the role of President, 
Parliament, and Prime Minister within the nation. The Presidency 
possesses a minimal role within Turkish government. The 
President’s duty is to promulgate laws voted on by the assembly, 
veto any laws considered unfavorable for Turkey’s future, and 
select the Prime Minister from amongst the members of the Grand 
National Assembly. He cannot discuss important issues, nor can he 
vote on them. The Grand National Assembly, unlike the 
Presidency, plays an active role within Turkey’s government. The 
Grand National Assembly may conduct interpellation, make, 
amend, interpret, or abrogate laws, declare war, coin money, or 
accept or reject contracts or concessions involving financial 
responsibility. The Prime Minister, like Parliament, plays a larger 
role in the Republic’s governance than the President. The Prime 
Minister oversees the smooth function and maintenance of 
government as well as promulgating regulations for the 
administration and execution of the law. 
 
The Referendum and the Revised Constitution 
 
In December 2016, Turkey’s AKP unveiled a new Constitution, 
henceforth referred to as the revised, or 2017 Constitution. The 
document introduced eighteen amendments, which drastically alter 
the structure of the Turkish government.46 To understand changes 
to the Turkish Constitution, it is necessary to examine the revised 
Constitution’s background, and its eighteen amendments, in 
comparison to its 1924 predecessor. The revised Constitution 
eliminates the role of Prime Minister and transfers the office’s 
executive power to the Presidency, greatly expands the President’s 
authority, and weakens the Turkish Parliament. This drastic 
                                                





departure from the 1924 Constitution threatens to greatly amplify 
the power of the Presidency whilst simultaneously weakening 
other branches of government, particularly the legislature. 
 The 2017 Constitution radically changes the manner of 
Presidential election as well as the manner in which the office 
functions. Instead of the Grand National Assembly electing the 
president from among its members, the President is now elected by 
direct popular vote. Presidential elections must be held in 
conjunction with the Assembly’s elections.47 The 1924 
Constitution states that legislative and executive power are vested 
in the Grand National Assembly.48 The 2017 Constitution changes 
this. Article 104 states that “executive authority belongs to the 
President.”49 Further, the revised document transfers the executive 
authority, and duties formerly invested in the office of Prime 
Minister to the Presidency. This includes power to appoint and 
dismiss ministers, high level public executives, and senior public 
officials. The 2017 Constitution further strengthens the Presidency 
by granting it the power to issue presidential decrees or by-laws to 
ensure the implementation of law.50 More ominously, the 
document also contains a section pertaining to the administration 
of states of emergency, which does not exist in the 1924 
Constitution. According to article 119, the President may issue a 
state of emergency in the event of war, situations necessitating 
war, uprisings, spread of violent and strong rebellious actions, or 
the widespread acts of violence aimed at the destruction of the 
order established by the Constitution.51 Additionally, the 
Presidency is no longer bound by law to remain politically neutral, 
meaning that a President may retain ties to his political party.52 The 
2017 Constitution enormously expands the powers allotted to the 
President of Turkey. It transfers much of the executive authority 
granted to the Grand National Assembly and Prime Minister under 
the 1924 Constitution to the President. In essence, the President 
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has ceased to be a ceremonial office, and has become the unrivaled 
center of executive authority.53 
 The 2017 revised Constitution also changed the manner in 
which members of the Grand National Assembly are chosen, and 
severely limited the scope of its powers, Particularly its role as a 
watchdog against corruption and counterbalance to presidential 
power. The Grand National Assembly’s longstanding powers of 
interpolation, and parliamentary investigation have been 
removed.5455 Consequently, the Assembly no longer possesses the 
power to check the Presidency or root out corruption within the 
governing administration. Likewise, the Assembly’s power to 
override Presidential vetoes has been strictly curtailed. The 1924 
Constitution enabled the Assembly to overrule a President’s veto 
through a majority vote of all present members.56 Conversely, the 
2017 Constitution requires an absolute majority of all members of 
the Assembly to overcome a veto.57 Thereby effectively nullifying 
the Assembly’s ability to overturn a Presidential veto in the 
foreseeable future, given the ruling AKP’s substantial 
parliamentary majority. 
 In addition to its overt efforts to limit the power of the 
Assembly, the 2017 Constitution also places new restrictions on 
who is eligible to seek election to the Assembly. The 1924 
Constitution barred criminals from running for office, as many 
nations do, but the 2017 document also bars individuals with ties to 
the military.58 To outside observers, this stipulation may seem 
strange. However, in light of Turkey’s long history of military 
involvement in politics, the provision is clearly intended to limit 
the political influence of the military, and by extension its ability to 
oppose the ruling party. 
To summarize, the 2017 Constitution radically reshapes the 
Turkish political landscape. The Grand National Assembly has 
ceased to be a political powerhouse and has been reduced to a 
largely ceremonial body. Meanwhile, the President has become a 
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powerful executive, beyond the reach of parliamentary checks and 
balances, and the AKP’s grip on power has been strengthened 
considerably. In light of these reforms, it is readily apparent just 
how far modern Turkey has departed from the legacy of Ataturk. 
The spirit of democracy and popular sovereignty that underpinned 
the 1924 Constitution is in full retreat. Erdogan’s new political 
order controls the future of Turkey. 
 
The Dangers of the Revised Constitution 
 
With Erdogan’s new order in full ascendancy, the question 
remains, what are the dangers posed by the President’s expanded 
executive authority, and the commensurate decline of 
parliamentary checks and balances? The first problem posed by the 
new Constitution stems from the President's ability to appoint and 
dismiss vice presidents, ministers, high level public executives, 
and senior public officials. This power allows the President to clear 
important offices of political rivals and replace them with members 
of his own political party. The President then holds direct sway 
over these new appointments, thereby creating powerful pawns in 
critical government departments. The 2017 Constitution creates 
further difficulties by no longer requiring the President to maintain 
political neutrality. This means the President may act as the leader 
of a political party.59 This is dangerous since, under the Turkish 
political party system, it would enable the President to decide who 
runs on his party’s ticket in parliamentary elections. If the 
President’s party controls the majority of seats in the Grand 
National Assembly, the President could, in effect, control the 
Assembly as well as its agenda. The end result is the total 
deterioration of governmental checks and balances.60 The greatest 
threat posed by the revised Constitution, however, originates from 
the President’s ability to make decrees that carry the full force of 
the law. So long as the President makes decrees that are not in 
conflict with “the provisions of the law,” he can make any decree 
he wishes.  
 In addition to the threats posed by the expanded role of the 
Presidency, the revised Constitution further undermines Turkish 
democracy through the weakening of the Grand National 
                                                







Assembly and its decreased capacity to check the Presidency. The 
revised Constitution abolishes the Assembly’s right to 
interpellation. In the past, interpellation allowed the Assembly to 
routinely monitor the function of government. If the Assembly 
discovered illegal or corrupt activity, they could hold a vote of 
confidence and remove a corrupt official from office.61 The loss of 
interpellation means that the Assembly has been stripped of its 
watchdog role within government. This, in turn, enables corrupt 
officials to abuse their power without fear of reprisal. Some 
Turkish politicians state that interpellation is not necessary since 
the people of Turkey directly elect the President. They argue that 
any action undertaken by the President is, therefore, the will of the 
people.62 This argument is flawed. Just because the Turkish people 
grant the President executive authority does not mean that the 
President will act in the best interest of the nation. It is important 
for the Grand National Assembly, whose members are also 
appointed through direct election, to possess the ability to expose 
and punish the abuse of executive power. Another problem posed 
by the revised Constitution is the fact that in order to overcome a 
President’s veto, it is now necessary for an absolute majority of all 
members of the Assembly to vote to overturn the veto. This new 
tenant of the Constitution weakens the Assembly’s ability to stop 
controversial legislation. So long as the President’s party holds the 
political majority in the Grand National Assembly, it is nearly 
impossible to overturn a veto. 
 The passage of the revised Constitution exposes Turkish 
democracy to a host of new challenges. The document grants 
unprecedented executive power to the President, allowing him to 
retain party ties, make sweeping presidential decrees, dismiss and 
appoint powerful officials at will, and potentially dominate the 
Grand National Assembly’s agenda. The Assembly now lacks the 
power to check the President’s expanded authority. The removal of 
the right to interpellation prevents the Assembly from routinely 
probing the government for corruption and illegal actions. In 
addition, the revision of the conditions needed to overturn a veto 
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makes it difficult for the Assembly to overrule the President’s 
decision should his party possess a political majority. This system 
allows for the exploitation of the people of Turkey, should the 
public elect a corrupt individual to serve as President. 
 
Who is Recep Tayyip Erdogan 
 
It is necessary to delve into President Erdogan’s personal beliefs, 
statements, and political history to understand why the unchecked 
expansion of executive power under the revised Constitution poses 
a threat to the Republic’s status as a secular democracy. Erdogan, 
like Ataturk, came from relatively humble origins and gained 
authority through political savvy and determination. Erdogan’s 
political career began in the early 1990s as part of the Islamist 
Welfare Party.63 The citizens of Istanbul elected him to the office 
of Mayor in 1994, after he promised to improve sanitation, 
increase water quality, and decrease traffic congestion. In 2001, 
Erdogan founded the Justice and Development party (AKP).64 The 
AKP gained remarkable traction under his leadership, claiming 
victory in the 2002, 2007, and 2011 elections. Shortly thereafter, 
Erdogan was elected Prime Minister of Turkey. As Prime Minister, 
he promised to combat corruption, open the Turkish economy to 
competition, and improve schools as well as sanitation in the 
Republic’s poorest areas.65 On the whole, Erdogan kept his 
promises. He directed billions of dollars toward development 
projects and led the Turkish economy to become the eighteenth 
largest in the world.66 Corruption, however, remains rife within 
Turkey’s government, though it has been “democratized.” These 
political victories made Erdogan popular with the Turkish public 
and carried him to the office of the Presidency in 2014. Erdogan’s 
meteoric rise to power and popularity with the Turkish public are a 
strange mirror to Ataturk’s own political story. This parallel, 
however, is where similarities between the two men end. 
 Unlike Ataturk, who saw Turkey’s Ottoman past as a 
shameful footnote in Turkic history, Erdogan ardently admires the 
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Ottoman Empire. Following the AKP’s 2011 election triumph, 
Erdogan called the election a victory for Turkey and its Ottoman 
heritage.67 A year later, he praised the contributions of those who 
would raise a generation that would “reach the level of our 
Ottoman and Seljuk ancestors.”68 During 2015 general elections, 
Erdogan even ordered the commission of a “Conquest Unit.” This 
unit, dressed as Ottoman Janissary soldiers and nearly five hundred 
strong, accompanied Erdogan on May 30th during a campaign 
speech in Istanbul’s Yenikapi square. An Ottoman Mehter, or 
military band, accompanied the soldiers.69 In addition to verbal and 
visual displays of his admiration for the Empire, Erdogan is 
politically aligned with a number of Turkish politicians seeking to 
recapture Turkey’s Ottoman past. One such individual is Ahmet 
Davutoglu, Erdogan’s former foreign policy advisor. In 2001, 
Davutoglu published a book called Strategic Depth: Turkey’s 
International Position, which argued that Turkey’s strategic depth 
is derived not from its geostrategic location and historical legacy as 
the Republic, but that of the Ottoman Empire.70 In addition, upon 
his election to the office of Prime Minister, Davutolgu swore to 
“bring the order and justice of the Ottoman Empire to today’s 
world.”71 His controversial statements and questionable foreign 
policy led the opposition to brand Davutoglu, and by extension, 
Erdogan, neo-Ottoman or imperialist. 
The differences between Erdogan and Ataturk do not end in 
their conflicting perspectives regarding Ottoman history. Though 
Ataturk initially presented himself as an ally of Islamic 
governance, he was, in reality, the opposite. The integration of 
Islam into law and governance, Ataturk believed, led to stagnation. 
This stagnation made the Ottomans unable to keep up with 
westernized nations and led to the Empire’s eventual collapse. This 
reasoning, Ataturk believed, justified his secularization of the 
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Republic’s government, courts, education systems, and social 
customs. Not only is Erdogan a devout Muslim, but his past and 
present political history indicates his support for the integration of 
Islamic law into Turkey’s governmental system. In his youth, 
Erdogan joined the Islamist National Salvation Party, or MSP. 
When the party was forced to rebrand itself as the Welfare Party 
following the 1980 Turkish coup, Erdogan followed.72 Erdogan 
became the party’s rising star and was the star pupil of the party’s 
leader, renowned Islamic politician Necmettin Erbakan. During his 
tenure as Prime Minister, Erbakan challenged the Republic’s pro-
Western, secular roots and attempted to draw closer relations with 
Arab states. Erbakan’s fiery criticism of the established 
government led to his subsequent removal power by the Turkish 
military in 1997.73 Erdogan was caught in the crossfire when he 
voiced protest against his mentor’s removal, reciting a poem 
declaring that “the mosques are our barracks, the domes our 
helmets, the minarets our bayonets, and the faithful our 
soldiers.”74Authorities arrested Erdogan, then tried him shortly 
thereafter. The court, believing his speech a threat to the 
established secular order, sentenced Erdogan to ten months in 
prison. 
 Following his release, Erdogan rebranded himself as a 
politician able to successfully reconcile Islam with democracy. His 
supporters state that Erdogan is no longer a young, Islamist radical. 
Rather, he aims to liberate religious Turkish peoples from the 
constraints and discrimination inflicted upon them by Ataturk’s 
secular legacy.75 The truth is, however, that Erdogan merely 
became more skilled in concealing his true convictions. During his 
tenure as Prime Minister, Erdogan steadily promoted Islam 
throughout the Turkish bureaucracy and education systems. He 
called on schools to raise a “new religious generation” and 
promote a more religious Turkey.76 In 2004, Erdogan stated that he 
sympathized with Palestinian terror organization Hamas. When 
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Hamas won the Palestinian elections, Erdogan warmly welcomed 
its leadership to Turkey.77 Hamas, however, is not the only Islamist 
organization that Erdogan supports. Over the years, Erdogan 
repeatedly voiced his approval of the Muslim Brotherhood. When 
the Brotherhood’s leader, Mohamed Morsi, won in the Egyptian 
elections, Erdogan received warm reception in Cairo. In the years 
after, Erdogan worked closely with Morsi, signing a one billion-
dollar loan to Egypt. When the Egyptian military overthrew Morsi 
in 2013, Erdogan called the move “unacceptable” and demanded 
Morsi’s release as well as his restoration to power.78 Erdogan’s 
support for radical Islamist organizations, however, is not the only 
indication that his convictions remain unchanged. Despite this fact, 
the Republic made little effort to expand the rights of religious 
minorities. Government authorities aggressively utilize Turkish 
Penal Code to silence critics of Islam.79 In one such case, a twitter 
user named Ertan P. received fifteen months in prison for tweets 
mocking Islam.80 Many individuals see Erdogan’s support for 
Islamist organizations and his government’s use of Turkish law to 
silence critics of Islam as an indication of his dedication not only 
to Islam, but also its integration into law. 
 To many Turkish politicians who still believe in secular 
government and Ataturk’s legacy, President Erdogan represents an 
existential threat to Turkish democracy. His admiration for the 
Ottoman past, radical Islamist leanings, as well as ties to neo-
Ottoman and Islamist politicians deviate profoundly from 
Ataturk’s pro-western, secularist tendencies. Though their policies 
may differ, both men are surprisingly similar not only in their 
respective rises to political power, but in their charisma, skilled 
oration, and political cunning. In the words of one Turkish citizen, 
if Ataturk had an evil twin, it would be Erdogan since his “views 
are mirror opposites of Ataturk’s” and that he is “the first 
overwhelming, larger-than-life figure in Turkish Public life since 
the Ghazi [Ataturk] himself.”81 In many ways, Erdogan is the 
Turkish Republic’s Anti-Ataturk. 
                                                
77 Ibid., 46. 
78 Fradkin and Libby, “Erdogan’s Grand Vision: Rise and Decline,” 46. 
79 Piccone, Five Rising Democracies: And The Fate of the International Liberal 
Order, 173. 
80 Ibid., 167. 






Erdogan’s War: The 2016 Coup and Purge 
 
In order to accurately forecast Turkey’s future under Erdogan, it is 
not only necessary to examine where Erdogan’s personal 
convictions deviate from Ataturk’s in regard to Turkey as a secular 
nation-state, but to examine Erdogan’s respect or lack thereof for 
the freedom, democracy, and sovereignty of the Turkish people. 
Nowhere has Erdogan made his position clearer than in his 
handling of alleged political dissidents in the wake of the 2016 
Turkish coup. 
 On July 15, 2016, a flight of Turkish fighter jets took off in 
the skies over Ankara while Turkish Army tanks stopped traffic on 
the bridges linking the European and Asian portions of Istanbul. 
Rebels launched raids on a number of critical government 
compounds, including the General Staff Headquarters and police 
Special Forces base.82 At 11:00 p.m., the Turkish government 
declared the raids an act of insurrection. An hour later, Erdogan 
called on the public to rally against the insurrectionists and take 
back Ataturk Airport. In response, eighty-thousand mosques urged 
their attendees to action.83 Citizens threw their bodies in front of 
tank treads and called for the rebels to put their weapons down. In 
some areas, the insurrectionists gave up their arms. In others, 
protesters were shot, run over by tanks, or violently beaten. On 
July 16, the rebels attempted to seize the parliament building, the 
National Intelligence Agency, as well as Erdogan’s hotel in 
Marmaris. They found the establishment empty, as Erdogan had 
already departed for Istanbul.84 The insurrectionists attempted to 
maintain control over captured areas but failed as resistance grew. 
Police rallied to the public’s cause and subdued a majority of the 
rebels. By the coup’s end, five anti-coup soldiers, sixty-two police 
officers, and one hundred seventy-three civilians lay dead while 
thousands more suffered injuries.85 
 In the coup’s wake, the Turkish government placed blame 
for the coup on Fethullah Gulen, a Turkish preacher and 
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businessman living in exile in the United States. Gulen was once 
Erdogan’s close associate and was instrumental in the AKP’s 
struggle to end military influence in Turkish politics.86 As a result, 
many of Gulen’s followers gained key positions in Turkish 
government, despite the fact that Gulen himself was not a member 
of the AKP. However, Gulen’s tremendous influence and 
Erdogan’s boundless ambition soon drew the two men into 
conflict. In 2013, a corruption investigation resulted in the arrest of 
many business people and bureaucrats tied to the AKP by Gulenist 
police officers.87 Tensions rapidly escalated between the AKP and 
Gulen’s followers, resulting in the mass arrest of Gulenists as well 
as Gulen’s flight to the United States. The conflict angered 
Erdogan, who claimed that those behind the corruption 
investigations sought to overthrow the established order. From that 
moment onward, Erdogan and the AKP devoted a massive amount 
of resources to eradicate Gulen and any remaining Gulenists from 
the Turkish political sphere. In the years following the Gulenist 
Uprising, the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) 
conducted numerous investigations into Gulen and his disciples.88 
In addition, Erdogan attempted to negotiate with United States 
authorities for Gulen’s extradition to Turkey, though his efforts 
proved a failure. Members of the Erdogan administration claimed 
that the 2016 coup materialized as a result of Gulenists’ fears that 
the government investigation into their questionable actions came 
to an end, and that members of the movement would soon be 
arrested.89 Gulen, however, denied any culpability, stating that 
Erdogan intended to use the coup as an excuse to seize power and 
“build a dictatorship.”90 Erdogan, Turkish intelligence agencies, 
and even the AKP’s opposition denied Gulen’s accusation. Instead, 
they continued to place blame upon Gulen and various intelligence 
failures in the months leading up to the coup.91  
The attempted coup shook the Turkish public to its core 
and created an atmosphere of fear and insecurity across the nation. 
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For his part, Erdogan preyed upon these fears, seizing the 
opportunity to claim more power. On July 22, 2016, the Turkish 
government declared a state of emergency “to be able to remove 
swiftly all the elements of the terrorist organization involved in the 
coup attempt.”92 The state of emergency expanded the scope of 
Presidential power within Turkey considerably, effectively 
allowing Erdogan and his officials to crack down on those they 
deemed responsible. Although a number of citizens spoke out 
against the expansion of Presidential power, the general public 
possessed little recourse against the massively expanded 
emergency powers of the AKP government. Attempting to ease the 
people’s concerns, government promised life would be no different 
than it was before. The state of emergency would simply allow for 
a peaceful transition to normality.93 Reality, however, was the 
opposite.  
Over the next several weeks, Turkish courts placed tens of 
thousands of suspects under arrest on charges of links to Gulen. 
These suspects, however, were not corrupt businessmen or 
Gulenist politicians. The accused ranged from military officials, 
pilots, police officers, and civil servants, to academics and 
teachers.94 By December 2016, the government sacked or 
suspended more than one hundred thousand individuals, with 
thirty-seven thousand more arrested. When the public questioned 
the government’s speedy arrest of those related to the coup, 
officials claimed that the nation’s intelligence agencies 
investigated Gulen and his followers for more than two years, 
allowing for the swift identification of guilty individuals.95 In 
addition, officials stated mass arrests were necessary in order to 
“root out all coup supporters from the state apparatus.”96 For a 
time, Erdogan’s declared state of emergency and the subsequent 
arrests of suspected Gulenists seemed justified. Erdogan appeared 
to practice extreme caution, detaining only those he perceived as a 
threat to the stability of the Republic. However, a number of 
disturbing reports emerged, detailing Erdogan’s abuse of the 
powers granted to him by the state of emergency. Suspected 
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Gulenists were not the Turkish government’s only victims. The 
crackdown widened to target media outlets, the Turkish 
intelligentsia, and even ordinary citizens critical of Erdogan and 
the established government. Erdogan’s internal security campaign 
had become a purge of all elements within Turkish society who 
resisted his political agenda, regardless of their actual ties to 
Fethullah Gulen. 
 Though dozens of media outlets were shut down on 
suspicion of links to the Gulenist movement, the global community 
grew increasingly concerned over Erdogan’s actions as rumors 
surfaced regarding the arrest or elimination of individuals and 
establishments unrelated to the Gulenist movement. The 
government targeted and shut down a number of media 
organizations that expressed their dissatisfaction with the Erdogan 
or the AKP’s policies. In addition, Erdogan jailed journalists or 
removed them from their jobs. Over 140 newspapers, magazines, 
and television channels were banned. In addition, the government 
detained over 150 journalists. One such individual is Asli Erdogan, 
a celebrated Turkish writer and member of the advisory board for a 
pro-Kurdish newspaper known as Ozgur Gundem.97 In August 
2016, Special Forces broke into Ms. Erdogan’s house in the middle 
of the night. “They were dressed as if they were going to war. 
Bulletproof vests, automatic weapons,” Ms. Erdogan recalled.98 
The soldiers arrested Ms. Erdogan on charges of disrupting the 
unity and integrity of the state, spreading terror propaganda, as 
well as being a member of the Kurdish militant group, the PKK.99 
Ms. Erdogan was flabbergasted. Though she wrote columns on 
torture, prison, Kurdish issues, and women’s rights, she never 
expected to be arrested for expressing her opinion. She denied all 
charges, stating that she committed no crime other than “being an 
adviser to a newspaper.”100 The court refused to listen to Ms. 
Erdogan and jailed her. Prison conditions were hellish. Ms. 
Erdogan spent three days in an eight square meter cell with no 
facilities, after which officers moved her to solitary 
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confinement.101 There, the jailers neglected her care, declining to 
offer basic amenities such as drinking water.102 Ms. Erdogan grew 
so weak, she was unable to walk. Though authorities eventually 
released Ms. Erdogan, she could still face life imprisonment if 
found guilty at her next hearing. Since her release, Ms. Erdogan 
has not written a single article. Memories of imprisonment silenced 
her pen. “I have been released but I do not feel free,” she 
confessed, “in Turkey, one would need to be very naïve to feel 
free.”103  
Ms. Erdogan and the media, however, are not the only 
victims of the crackdown. At the start of his administration, 
President Erdogan and the AKP introduced a series of educational 
reforms, which led to the adoption of a more conservative 
curriculum.104 These reforms included the removal of evolutionary 
theory, the inclusion of extensive religious classes, as well as the 
addition of the coup into social history classes.105 The new 
curriculum placed less emphasis upon the founding of the Republic 
and the early Republican years, and more emphasis upon the 
transition to a multiparty democracy and the rise of center-right 
politics.106 After the coup, universities dismissed over one 
thousand academics and accused them of being members of the 
Gulenist movement.107 The truth, however, is that these dismissals 
were part of a “political witch hunt” intended to eliminate the 
AKP’s political rivals. In response to both the removal of valuable 
teachers and researchers from their positions, as well as academic 
censorship, Turkish professors and students joined in resistance 
against the government.108 At Ankara University, a group of 
professors attempted to enter the campus. When the police stopped 
them, they took off their academic robes and laid them before the 
policemen.109 In other areas, Professors opened tents to teach 
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courses not only to students, but to the community as well.110  
 In addition to his efforts to censor academia and the media, 
Erdogan also aims to silence citizens who criticize his policies, as 
well as those possessing vague connections to the Gulenist 
movement. One such victim is Sezgin Yurkadel, a ferry worker. 
One morning, Yurkadel’s superiors called him to a meeting at the 
Greater Istanbul Municipality’s ferry line administration.111 They 
presented Yurkadel with a stack of documents from his daughter’s 
school as well as copies of his bank statements. Yurkadel’s 
employers pointed out that Yurkadel’s daughter attended a school 
run by Gulen’s followers.112 In addition, Yurkadel was a patron of 
Bank Asya, an institution run by Gulenists until the government 
seized it in 2015. This close association with Gulenist institutions, 
the employers surmised, must mean that Yurkadel and his family 
were themselves Gulenists.113 Yurkadel attempted to argue against 
these accusations, pointing out that the Ministry of Education 
certified his daughter’s school and that his employer deposited 
educational assistance into his account at Bank Asya, which was 
one of Turkey’s largest banks.114 He stated that he chose Asya 
because it followed the traditional Islamic banking principles of 
not paying interest. Yurkadel’s employers remained unconvinced 
and fired him. In the time since, Yurkadel applied for over twenty 
jobs without success. His supposed Gulenist ties, no matter how 
distant, exiled him to the fringes of Turkish society.115 Sadly, 
Yurkadel is merely one of thousands of cases of state sponsored 
ostracization on the grounds of alleged Gulenist ties in Turkey 
today. 
On the night of the coup, twenty-three-year-old air force 
trainee Yusuf Yamandag was stationed at a training camp located a 
few hours away from Istanbul.116 In the midst of drills, one of 
Yamandag’s superiors ordered the trainees onto a bus, armed them, 
then ordered them to Istanbul to help police counter the Gulenist 
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threat. Protesters stopped the bus before it reached the city and 
arrested the trainees. The government later charged Yamandag and 
his comrades with the attempted assassination of the President as 
well as conspiring to dismantle the Republic.117 Yamandag’s 
family insists that their son is innocent, despite government 
allegations that the Air Force Academy was filled with Gulen 
sympathizers. Like Yurkadel, Turkish citizens labeled the 
Yamandag family as undesirable and ostracized them.118 The 
family’s neighbors and friends refuse to associate with them, while 
those on the street verbally abuse them. 
 The bloodshed and terror surrounding the failed 2016 coup 
spurred nationwide paranoia about Turkey’s political stability. 
Erdogan harnessed these insecurities to initiate a massive power 
grab and enact an extensive purge intended to silence political 
dissent across the nation. Erdogan’s actions demonstrate his 
flagrant lack of respect toward the rights and sovereignty of the 
Turkish people. One can surmise that with the expanded powers 
granted to him by the revised Constitution, Erdogan’s purge will 
not only continue, but grow in scope. 
 
The Writing on the Wall 
 
Erdogan’s power grab in the wake of the 2016 coup, and 
subsequent purge are not the only indications of his blatant 
disregard for popular sovereignty. In his attempt to distance 
himself from his past as a fire-tongued pro-Islamist politician, 
Erdogan rebranded himself as a democratic reformer bent on 
eliminating entrenched corruption. This reinvention of his image 
was largely successful. Erdogan’s rebellious past, including his 
criminal history, were erased from public memory. The Turkish 
public believed Erdogan to be a political moderate, far removed 
from the youthful radical arrested for reciting Islamist poetry in the 
wake of his Islamist mentor’s removal from office. Regardless of 
his closely managed ‘moderate’ political persona, the truth is very 
different. Close analysis of a number of Erdogan’s contentious 
statements following his political rebirth, reveal that Erdogan is not 
as far removed from his political past as he claims. Rather, they 
reveal a man with little respect for democracy and freedom of 









Following the detainment of thousands of suspected 
Gulenists, academics, and Erdogan’s political opponents by the 
Turkish police, Erdogan made several concerning statements 
regarding freedom and democracy in Turkey. In a speech to local 
politicians in Ankara, Erdogan criticized those concerned with the 
erosion of liberty and democracy as a result of his national state of 
emergency. Erdogan declare that “For us, these phrases [freedom 
and democracy] have absolutely no value any longer.”119 He went 
on to argue in favor of prosecuting journalists, lawyers, and 
politicians allied with the Gulenist movement or PKK as 
terrorists.120 Nor is this the first time Erdogan vocalized his 
disregard for democracy. In the midst of the reinvention of his 
political identity, Erdogan stated that “democracy is like a train. 
We shall get out when we arrive at the station we want.”121 This 
statement demonstrates that Erdogan’s present disregard for 
secular democracy is not a recent development, but an integral part 
of his political identity; skillfully hidden through careful posturing. 
In addition to concerning statements regarding democracy, 
Erdogan also made clear his disdain for freedom of speech. In 
2014, Erdogan, then Prime Minister, was the subject of a large 
scandal which uncovered corruption within his administration. The 
story spread like wildfire through social media platforms like 
Twitter and YouTube and dealt a severe blow to Erdogan’s 
credibility. Erdogan, angered by the evidence, set out to wage war 
on social media. Later that year, Erdogan acquired a court order 
which allowed him to ban Twitter from the Republic.122  
The Turkish people rose in protest against Erdogan’s 
decision, claiming it infringed upon freedom of speech. Despite 
public protests, Erdogan remained unsympathetic. He argued that 
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the charges of corruption mounted against him were false, and that 
they never would have spread had it not been for social media. He 
expressed his desire to expand the ban to YouTube, Facebook, and 
other social media platforms.123 Erdogan’s Twitter crusade is not 
the only piece of evidence that displays his distrust, or even hatred, 
for freedom of speech. In the same year as his controversial 
Twitter ban, Erdogan addressed the Committee to Protect 
Journalists, or CPJ, at Ankara’s International Press Institute. He 
defended his government’s regulation of internet information, by 
stating that his laws made online media “safer and more free.”124 
The day before, however, he told the CPJ that the “media should 
have never been given the liberty to insult.” In addition, he stated 
he was “increasingly against the internet everyday.”125 This attack 
on social media, online information, as well as the press displays 
Erdogan’s total lack of respect and distaste for free speech. 
Though Erdogan succeeded in reinventing himself as a 
moderate Islamic politician, dedicated to the elimination of 
corruption and the defense of democracy within the Turkish 
government. Erdogan’s political statements, continue to suggest 
the opposite. Erdogan holds little respect for democracy, naming it 
a “train” that Turkey may disembark from whenever it pleases. In 
addition, Erdogan believes that freedom and democracy are ideals 
that have “no value.” Erdogan’s statements also express a dislike 
of freedom of speech. He attempted to ban numerous social media 
outlets critical of his Presidency, declared that the media should 
never have been given freedom to “insult,” and asserted his 
increasing opposition to the internet. These contentious statements 
and actions display Erdogan’s antipathy towards democracy and 
freedom of speech in general. Both are barriers, which hinder his 
quest for absolute control over the Republic. 
 
The Future of the Republic 
 
In light of Erdogan’s clear hostility to secular governance and 
                                                
123 Ibid. 
124 Damien Sharkov, “Turkey’s Erdogan says he is ‘increasingly against the 
internet every day,’” Newsweek, October 3, 2014, 
http://www.newsweek.com/turkeys-erdogan-says-he-increasingly-against-
internet-every-day-275014. 







democracy, combined with the unprecedented powers now vested 
in him by the 2017 Constitution, Turkey’s future hinges on one 
critical question: is this the end of Ataturk’s legacy? Nearly one 
hundred years ago, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk created the Republic of 
Turkey as a secular democracy which placed the people’s 
sovereignty above all else. This system of government, though not 
without flaws, accorded Turkish citizens a voice in their nation’s 
future. The 2017 Constitution undoes Ataturk’s legacy. It grants 
the President sweeping political powers, transfers the Prime 
Minister’s duties to the Presidency, and weakens the Grand 
National Assembly’s power to check executive authority. President 
Erdogan possesses a well-documented history as an outspoken 
advocate of Islamist government, with ties to fundamentalist 
Islamist groups and politicians, including the Palestinian terror 
network Hamas, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, and the 
Brotherhood’s leader Mohamed Morsi. Furthermore, Erdogan is an 
avid supporter of revising Turkey’s educational system to include 
Islamic history classes, as part of a broader campaign to raise 
Turkey’s newest generation to be more religious than the last. 
Erdogan is also an ardent admirer of Turkey’s Ottoman past, even 
going so far as to dress Turkish soldiers as Ottoman janissaries 
during important political events in order to recapture the glory of 
the Empire. Additionally, he socializes with a number of neo-
Ottoman politicians bent on the rebirth of the Ottoman Empire. 
With the increased executive power granted to him under the 2017 
Constitution, Erdogan could eventually reintegrate Islamic law into 
Turkish governance. This would result in the death of the Republic 
as a secular power and the final destruction of Ataturk’s legacy. 
 In addition to dismantling Turkey’s secular government, 
the 2017 Constitution also opens the door for the end of Turkish 
democracy. Erdogan’s political history and statements demonstrate 
that he desires absolute control over the Republic and will not 
hesitate to eliminate individuals who stand in his way. Following 
the 2016 Turkish coup, Erdogan carried out an enormous purge of 
media outlets, academics, and ordinary citizens opposed to his 
leadership. Many of these individuals committed no crime. They 
simply voiced their disapproval aloud or possessed ephemeral ties 
to Erdogan’s enemies. Most ominously, Erdogan stated that liberty 
and democracy had little meaning in the Republic, and he is well 
positioned to act on his rhetoric. Indeed, Erdogan’s actions and 





status as a secular nation, but as a democracy itself. 
Bearing Erdogan’s actions and newfound power in mind, 
Turkey’s future rests firmly in the hands of the President. Given 
his record so far, it seems likely that Erdogan will use the 
expanded Presidency to make himself the absolute authority in the 
Republic of Turkey. Indeed, Erdogan now possesses all of the 
necessary tools and powers to govern as an autocrat. He has 
already abused the power to declare states of emergency in order 
extend the current political purge, until he eliminates the 
opposition or terrorizes them into silence. Likewise, he will utilize 
the power to appoint and dismiss high office officials to rid the 
government of his rivals and replace them with cooperative 
puppets. In addition, so long as the AKP possesses a political 
majority in the Grand National Assembly, any Presidential decree 
Erdogan declares will pass, especially considering his dual role as 
President and party leader. Furthermore, if Erdogan builds strong 
Islamic support within the Republic, he could pave the way for the 
reintegration of Islamic law into Turkish government. Should 
Erdogan take this path, the Republic of Turkey will cease to exist 
as Ataturk intended and be transformed from a secular democracy 




Nearly one hundred years ago, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk envisioned 
a new Turkey. He drew upon his experiences as a citizen of the 
Ottoman Empire, analyzing the failings of its political and social 
systems in order to create a nation that he believed would weather 
the test of time. Ataturk believed religion led to the social, 
political, and technological stagnation of the Ottoman Empire. 
Thus, religion was separated from government to the greatest 
degree possible in the newborn Republic. He saw the corruption 
created by a system of governance deaf to the voice of the common 
people as antithetical to the stability and prosperity of a modern 
nation. Consequently, Ataturk and his allies set about to create a 
representative system, defended by a series of institutionalized 
checks and balances. In order to solidify these reforms, Ataturk led 
a campaign of aggressive secularization and westernization. The 
end result was a government with a ceremonial Presidency and a 
strong Parliament that shared its executive authority with an 






 The passage of the revised 2017 Constitution reverses the 
nation’s political balance of power, by empowering the Presidency, 
eliminating the office of Prime Minister, and weakening the 
Parliament’s ability to check the executive branch’s authority. 
Under this redesigned system, the nation’s future is largely 
dependent upon the type of individual the Turkish people choose to 
elect as President. Thus, a corrupt President will not act in the 
nation’s best interests. He will take advantage of the powers 
granted to him by the Constitution, using his immense political 
clout to dominate the Republic’s political system and drive all 
opposition into exile, or worse. 
President Erdogan’s character, political history, and 
controversial statements seem to suggest that he will use the power 
of the revised Constitution to transform the Republic of Turkey 
into an Islamic authoritarian state. Erdogan is a supporter of the 
religious revision of Turkish education, communes regularly with 
neo-Ottoman politicians, and voiced his unwavering support for 
controversial Islamist organizations such as Hamas and the Muslim 
Brotherhood. He abused the powers granted to him by the recent 
Turkish state of emergency to rid the Republic of his rivals. 
Finally, Erdogan waged war against social media platforms for 
uncovering government corruption and declared that Turkey no 
longer needed liberty or democracy. The 2017 Constitution grants 
Erdogan all the tools he needs to expand these policies, widen the 
length and scope of his political purges, and pave the way toward 
the end of secularism in Turkey. The Grand National Assembly 
now lacks the ability to stop Erdogan, should the Turkish people 
wish for it to intercede. Thus, Turkey is now at the mercy of 
Erdogan and the AKP. Ataturk’s secular Republic is dead, all that 
remains to be seen now is just what form Erdogan’s new, 
autocratic order will take, and whether it will attempt to re-assert 
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